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Case No. 20080393-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Heather Carlson,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for three counts of possession of a
controlled substance in a drug-free zone, all second degree felonies, and possession
of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Should the extra-record evidence contained in the addendum to

defendant's brief be stricken?
Standard of review. Because the extra-record evidence contained in the
addendum to defendant's brief was never before the trial court, no standard of
review applies.
2. Was defendant denied her right to a speedy trial?

Standard of review. This issue was not preserved below and defendant asserts
no exception to the preservation rule on appeal. It is also inadequately briefed.
Therefore, no standard of review applies.
3. Was defendant denied an alleged right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment at trial?
Standard of review. This issue was not preserved below and defendant asserts
no exception to the preservation rule on appeal. It is also madequately briefed.
Therefore, no standard of review applies.
4. Was defendant erroneously denied her self-representation right?
Standard of review. This issue is inadequately briefed. Therefore, no standard
of review applies.
5. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective because he did not move for a
new trial in front of the jury?
Standard of review. This issue is inadequately briefed. Therefore, no standard
of review applies.
6. Was defendant's due process right violated because the testimony of one of
six witnesses against her, and a portion of her own testimony, was not recorded?
Standard of review. This issue is inadequately briefed. Therefore, no standard
of review applies.
2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B):
The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . [a] statement of the issues
presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority; and . . . citation to the
record showing that the issue was preserved in the court; or . . . a
statement of the grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved
in the trial court.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9):
The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . [a]n argument. The
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with three counts of possession of a
controlled substance in a drug-free zone (methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroine),
all second degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) and
58-37-8(4) (a) (i-viii) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); and possession of drug paraphernalia
in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 5837a-5 and 58-37-8(4)(a)(i-viii) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). R113-115.
Conviction. Following a one-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as
charged. R153-56.
3

Sentence. The trial court imposed concurrent prison terms of one to fifteen
years for the three felony convictions, and a concurrent one-year jail term for the
misdemeanor conviction. Rl 77-79. The trial court then stayed execution of the
sentence and placed defendant on probation. Rl 79-181.
Appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R188.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A dispatch operator for the St. George Police Department received a 911 call
from defendant on the night of 16 November 2005. R205:59.. Defendant gave the
operator her first name only, and said that her boyfriend had overdosed. Id. When
the operator asked defendant what her boyfriend had overdosed on, defendant said
heroin. Id. Defendant also said that her boyfriend's name was Jonah, and that he
was twenty-six years old. Id. at 62. The operator observed that defendant " w a s . . .
not making a lot of sense, kind of rambling." Id. at 59. According to the operator, "It
was very hard to get information from [defendant]." Id. Defendant eventually
revealed to the operator that she was "in some apartments on South River Road,
and that she had also taken heroin." Id. Defendant was non-responsive when the
operator asked for a specific apartment number: "I had an open line, but could not
get anybody to answer to me. All I could hear was what sounded like labored
breathing in the background." Id. at 60. The operator immediately "dispatched two
4

ambulances and officers down to South River Road to start looking for apartments
in that area." Id. at 59-60.
Using defendant's cell phone number and first name, the operator searched
the police department database and, after about five to seven minutes, was able to
identify a possible apartment or unit number. Id. at 60. Defendant's apartment was
ultimately located only after the responding officers began knocking on doors. Id. at
60-61. The dispatch operator, who still had an open line, was listening and alerted
officers via radio that they were outside the right apartment when she heard
pounding on defendant's door. Id. at 61.
When the responding officers received no response to their knocking and
identification of themselves as police officers, they forced entry into defendant's
apartment. Id. 65-66. By the time the officers entered the apartment it was
approximately 1:00 a.m. Id. at 66. They were immediately confronted by a pitbull
"in a very aggressive manner, barking, being very aggressive." Id. Officer Bahlman,
one of the officers who responded to defendant's apartment, noticed that a light was
on "in the upstairs loft, but there weren't any other lights on" in the apartment.
R63-66. He and the other officers concluded that the individuals in need of aid must
be in the loft, but the officers were unable to reach them because the pit bull was
blocking the staircase. Id. at 66. Officer Bahlman sprayed the pit bull with pepper
5

spray and it retreated up the stairs. Id. The officers followed and found defendant
and Jonah. Id.
Jonah was "laying on the bed/' with his feet "hanging off the end." Id. His
left arm was also hanging off the bed. Id. In Officer Bahknan's opinion, Jonah
appeared dead. Id. at 66-67. There was "no real color in his skin, no signs of life. Id.
at 66. Upon closer inspection, Officer Bahlman detected a faint pulse in Jonah's
neck. Id.
Defendant was standing at the foot of the bed, trying to control her pit bull;
she eventually put the dog in the bathroom. Id. at 67-68. Officer Bahlman observed
that defendant "appeared very pale, and obviously appeared concerned." Id. at 67.
According to Officer Bahlman, defendcint also seemed to "be kind of out of it as far
as what was going on. She seemed somewhat confused as far as how everything
was coming about." Id. at 68. Based on Officer Bahlman's training and experience,
he believed that "she was under the influence." Id. at 73. He based his opinion on
defendant's demeanor, flushed face, and the multitude of visible drug
paraphernalia scattered around defendant's bedroom. Id.
Officer Bahlman observed drug paraphernalia throughout defendant's
bedroom. Id. He saw six syringes, one of which appeared to contain heroin. Id. at
68, 70-71. The syringes were on a dresser in the bedroom, "as well as on the floor
6

right in front of the dresser area," next to the bed. Id. at 70. Also on the dresser
were a syringe cap, a rubber balloon tied in a tiny ball, which in the officer's
experience is commonly used to package and sell drugs, and a mint candy container
that contained a white residue he suspected to be methamphetamine. Id. at 72.
Officer Bahlman also found a large tablespoon on defendant's bed near the
headboard. Id. at 71. The spoon was burned black on the underside and also
contained a little cotton. Id. at 68,71. In Officer Bahlman's training and experience,
the condition of the spoon "was consistent with cooking some sort of drug to ingest
it." Id. at 68.; see also id. at 71. Residue inside the spoon later testified positively for
methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. Id. at 103.
In the adjoining bathroom, Officer Bahlman found a glass pipe with residue
that later tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. at 71-72,103.
Finally, the officer observed that defendant's apartment was located
approximately fifty feet from a public golf course. Id. at 79.
Greg Tobler was one of the paramedics that responded to defendant's
apartment. Id. at 80-82. By the time he arrived, defendant was being helped to the
ambulance. Id. at 82. Tobler observed that defendant appeared confused and "kind
of droopy." Id. Tobler took defendant's vitals and found her pulse rate to be 121.
Id. This high rate alarmed him because it indicated tachycardia. Id. Defendant told
7

Tobler that "she and her boyfriend took heroin prior to calling 911." Id.; see also id.
at 85. Based on his twenty plus years of experience, Tobler believed defendant was
under the influence of a controlled substance. Id. at 83. He based his opinion on
defendant's "confused state," "heart rate," "sinus rhythm—or sinus tach on the
monitor," and the "fixed" "condition" of her pupils at three millimeters, which were
not responding to light. Id.; see also id. at 85 Defendant also looked sleepy and worn
out. Id. at 83. Her droopy appearance was inconsistent with her fast heart rate,
which is also a sign of possible drug overdose. Id. at 83-84.
Officer Brklacich was one of the officers that accompanied Officer Bahlman
into defendant's apartment. R205:87. He testified similarly to Officer Bahlman
regarding his observations of drug paraphernalia in defendant's bedroom, and
defendant's appearance of being under the influence of controlled substances. See
R205:86-92. Additionally, Officer Brklacich interviewed defendant at the hospital.
Id. at 92. He observed that defendant was more coherent at the hospital than she
had been at her apartment. Id.; see also id. at 95. After receiving a Miranda warning,
defendant told the officer that she and Jonah had ingested heroin at the apartment.
Id. at 92-93. Defendant admitted that the apartment belonged to her, and that Jonah
was staying there with her. Id. at 93. Defendant said that she shot the heroin into
her arm, and she also admitted that the meth pipe was "most likely hers." Id.
8

In addition to the above testimony, the State adduced evidence from Jonah,
defendant's boyfriend. Id. at 105-106. Jonah's trial testimony was not recorded,
however, because the courtroom recorder was inadvertently turned off for
approximately twenty minutes and was not turned back on until after defendant
herself had taken the witness stand and was being cross-examined. Id. at 106.
In the portion of defendant's cross-examination that was recorded, and her redirect
examination, she denied telling the officers and Tobler that she had taken heroin,
and claimed that her condition on the night of the 911 call was due to her use of
prescribed medications.

Id. at 106-108.

She also suggested that the drug

paraphernalia was brought into her apartment by Jonah, and that she had been
confused by the officers' questions. Id. at 108.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The addendum to defendant's brief contains three affidavits in which

she expounds on the issues raised in her brief. It also contains a letter purporting to
be from a local civil rights organization. However, none of these documents were
ever before the trial court. They should therefore be stricken from defendant's brief.
II.

Defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation is unpreserved and

defendant argues no exception to the preservation rule. It is also inadequately
briefed. Defendant's speedy trial claim should therefore be rejected.
9

m.

Defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment at trial is

unpreserved and defendant argues no exception to the preservation rule. It is also
inadequately briefed. Defendant's cruel and unusual punishment claim should
therefore be rejected.
IV.

Defendant's claim that she was erroneously denied her right to self-

representation is inadequately briefed and should therefore be rejected.
V.

Defendant's claim that she was denied the effective assistance of

counsel because her trial attorney did not move for a new trial in front of the jury is
inadequately briefed and should therefore be rejected.
VI.

Defendant's claim that her right to due process was violated because

the testimony of one of six witnesses against her, as well as a portion of her own
testimony, was not recorded, is inadequately briefed and should therefore be
rejected. Additionally, defendant makes no attempt to show that any of the claims
she raises on appeal depends for resolution on the unrecorded testimony. And
while defendant does not appear to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the
recorded testimony of five state's witnesses abundantly supports the jury verdicts.
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ARGUMENT
Defendant is a "self-represented party/' Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, f 11,
611 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. She "is therefore entitled to every consideration that may
reasonably be indulged." Id. (case citation and quotation marks omitted).
"However, [a]s a general rule, a party who represents [her]self will be held to the
same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar . . .
." Id. (case citation and quotation marks omitted) (first brackets in original).
Additionally, "'reasonable' indulgence is not unlimited indulgence." Id. There is
thus no requirement that courts "attempt to redress the ongoing consequences of
the party's decision to function in a capacity for which [s]he is not trained." Id.)
see also State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,1119-21,28 128 P.3d 1171 (declining to
excuse Winfield from invited error doctrine and preservation rule because he
was acting pro se).
POINT I
THE EXTRA-RECORD EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE
ADDENDUM TO DEFENDANT'S BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN
Extra-record evidence attached to defendant's brief should be stricken.
Specifically, the addendum to defendant's brief contains three affidavits in which
she expounds on the various issues she raises on appeal. The addendum also
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contains a letter purporting to be from the local chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union. None of these documents were ever before the trial court.
An appellate court's "review is of course limited to the evidence contained in
the record on appeal." Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah
1985). "[AJppellate courts of this state do not consider new evidence on appeal."
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843,847 (Utah App. 1994) (declining to take judicial
notice of date that postal zip codes were introduced to the public (citing Low v.
Bonacci, 788 P.2d 513, 513 (Utah 1990)). Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, requires the appellant to include "in the record" a transcript of all
evidence relevant to any finding or conclusion appellant claims is unsupported by
or is contrary to the evidence.

"Additionally, although the record may be

supplemented if anything material is omitted, it may not be done by simply
including the omitted material in the party's addendum." State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8,
17,974 P.2d 279 (citing Utah R. App. P. 11 (h)). The extraneous evidence contained
in the addendum to defendant's brief should therefore be stricken. Id. (striking
extraneous evidence attached to Pliego's brief); see also State v. Law, 2003 UT App
228,12,75 P.3d 923 (declining to consider extraneous documents attached to Law's
brief).
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POINT n
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF A SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION IS BOTH
UNPRESERVED AND INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
For the first time on appeal, defendant alleges a violation of her right to a
speedy trial. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 3, 6. She does not, however, argue that any
exception to the preservation rule applies. Id. It may not therefore be addressed by
this Court. In any event, defendant's claim is also inadequately briefed, and it
should be rejected on this ground as well.
A. Defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation is unpreserved and
she asserts no exception to the preservation rule.
Utah Courts will not consider claims that are raised "for the first time on
appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances
exist." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,123,128 P.3d 1171 (case citation and quotation
marks omitted); see also State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 33,122 P.3d 543; State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346; State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,551 (Utah 1987). Utah's
courts require timely and specific objections "in order 'to bring all claimed errors to
the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if
appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted);
see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, <f 11 ("'[T]he trial court ought to be given an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it'") (quoting
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State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)).
"Accordingly, an objection 'must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such
that the trial [court] can consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45,J 33 (quoting Brown, 856
P.2d at 361).
Here, defendant asserts that her speedy trial right was violated. See Aplt. Br.
at 3, 6. But defendant does not indicate where in the record this issue was
preserved. Id. Nor does she claim that any exception to the preservation rule
applies to these claims. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(5) (requiring appellants to
provide "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court: o r . . . a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court"). This issue may not therefore be addressed on appeal. See Winfield,
2006 UT 4, f 23 n.6 (declining to infer a. plain error argument); State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review unpreserved issue because
Pledger did not argue that review was justified by "'exceptional circumstances' or
plain error'" (case citation omitted)).
B. Defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation is inadequately
briefed.
Defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation is also inadequately briefed and
should therefore be rejected on this ground as well. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App
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170, f 15,72 P.3d 138 (refusing to consider inadequately briefed argument); Mackay
v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941,947-48 (Utah 1998).
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules Rule of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant
to include his "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented,"
including "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be
addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). "'A
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited.'" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)).
Here, defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation is unsupported by citation
to the record, applicable case authority, and meaningful analysis. State v. Price, 827
P.2d 247,248-50 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1109 (Utah App.
1995). It consists solely of two conclusory sentences appearing pages apart in her
brief. See Aplt. Br. at 3,6. Defendant thus fails to make any clear assertions. Price,
827 P.2d at 248-50; Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d at 1109.
This Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, \ 31, 973 P.2d 404
(quoting Bishop, 753 P.23d at 450)); accord State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
15

1998). Accordingly, defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation should be rejected.
See Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31 (refusing to consider appellant's claim due to lack of
meaningful analysis of cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to
address claim on appeal where brief "wholly lack[ed] legal analysis and authority to
support [Wareham's] argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,548-49 (Utah App.
1998) (same); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599,602 (Utah App. 1992) (same).
POINT m
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
DURING TRIAL IS BOTH UNPRESERVED AND INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED
Defendant claims that her right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
was violated during her trial below. Aplt. Br. at 4-9. Similar to her speedy trial
claim, defendant's cruel and unusual punishment claim is unpreserved and
inadequately briefed. It should therefore be rejected.
A. Defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment at trial is
unpreserved and she asserts no exception to the preservation rule.
Defendant alleges a violation of an alleged right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment at trial. See, e.g., A.plt. Br. at 4-9. But defendant does not assert
that this issue is preserved. Id. Nor does she claim that any exception to the
preservation rule applies to this claim. Id. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(5) (requiring
appellants to provide "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in
16

the trial court: or . . . a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court"). Accordingly, based on rule 24(a)(5) and the other
authorities set out in Point HA. of the State's brief, this issue may not be addressed
on appeal.
B. Defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment at trial is
inadequately briefed.
Additionally, defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment during trial
is inadequately briefed: she fails to make clear assertions, cite to the record, or to
provide an analytical basis for her claim. See Aplt. Br. at 4-9. Indeed, the
constitutional provision defendant cites does not apply to trial proceedings. See
Utah Const. Art. I, § 9 ("Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishment be inflicted. Persons arrested
or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor"). Accordingly, based on
the authority cited in Point II.B. of the State's brief, defendant's cruel and unusual
punishment claim is inadequately briefed and should therefore be rejected.
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POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
DENIED HER SELF-REPRESENTATION RIGHT IS INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED
Defendant asserts that she was erroneously denied her self-representation
right below. Aplt. Br. at 3-4, 6. This issue too is inadequately briefed and should
therefore be rejected.
Although defendant cites to the record in support of her claim that her right
to self-representation was violated below, she cites no supporting authority,
provides no meaningful analysis, and makes no clear assertions. See Aplt. Br. at 3-4,
6. Moreover, defendant does not acknowledge in her brief that she ultimately
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abandoned her attempt to represent herself at trial. See also I^OS^O.1 Accordingly,
based on the authority cited in Point n.B. of the State's brief, defendant's claim that
her self-representation right was erroneously denied is inadequately briefed and
should therefore be rejected.

1

The trial court questioned defendant extensively regarding her request to
proceed pro se. See R250:47-50. He asked about her level of education and prior
experience in a courtroom. Id. at 47. Defendant said she had graduated high school
and also had "some college," but that she had no prior courtroom experience. Id.
The trial court also questioned defendant's understanding of the rules of evidence,
and in particular, whether she understood "what hearsay is?" Id. at 48. Based on
defendant's answers to further queries, the trial court determined that she did not
understand the hearsay rules. Id. at 48-49. The trial court told defendant that she
had the right to represent herself, but also emphasized that if she did choose to
represent herself, "to put it in really blunt terms, [the trial court would essentially]
throw [her] into the water with the sharks . . . because [defendant had] never done
this before." Id. at 49. The trial court emphasized that defendant had never picked a
jury, did not "understand the first thing about the rules of evidence," and did not
likely understand "anything about the rules of procedure." Id. The trial court
emphasized that if defendant were convicted, he doubted that she would know how
to ask for a new trial: "Would you know anything about that, ma'am?" Id. at 50.
Finally, the trial court asked defendant if she planned to deliver her unborn child
"without any assistance? Are you going to do that on your own too?" Id. When
defendant responded negatively, the trial court commented, "I would hope not." Id.
Thereafter, the trial court inquired whether defendant "still want[ed] to fire Mr.
Christiansen and handle this one on your own?" Id. Defendant responded: "I don't
know what I want to do." Id. (emphasis added). The trial court then informed Mr.
Christiansen that he [Christiansen] was "going to say on [the case]." Id.
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POINT V
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE DID NOT
MOVE FOR A NEW TRIAL IN FRONT OF THE JURY IS
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
Defendant's claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he
did not move for a new trial "in front of the Jury," Aplt. Br. at 4,6, is inadequately
briefed. It should therefore be rejected.
Indeed, defendant identifies no basis for a new trial motion, let alone any
authority that such a request must be made "in front of the Jury." Id. In light of
these shortcomings, defendant's brief has not, and cannot "overcome the strong
presumptions that counsel's performance fell 'within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance' and that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action
"might be considered sound trial strategy."'" State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
Defendant therefore fails to establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding defendant must "show that
counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense"). Accordingly, based on the authority cited in Point n.B. of the State's
brief, defendant's claim is inadequately briefed and should therefore be rejected.
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POINT VI
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HER DUE PROCESS RIGHT WAS
VIOLATED BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF ONE OF SIX
WITNESSES AGAINST HER, AND A PORTION OF HER OWN
TESTIMONY, WAS NOT RECORDED, IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
Defendant notes in her brief that "the testimony of the State's Key Witness
against [her], Convict Jonah [NJampel," was not recorded, along with "at least half
of the testimony of [defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 8. (citing R205:105-07); see also id. at 2.
Defendant asserts that the trial transcript is therefore "incomplete" and
"inaccurate," and that it thus violates her right to due process: "Without this
document in its entirety [defendant] is unable to enjoy Due Process of Law." Aplt.
Br. at 8. Like all of defendant's other claims, her due process claim is inadequately
briefed and should therefore be rejected.
Defendant references the state due process clause in her brief, but she does
not reference the federal due process clause, nor does she cite to any case authority,
or provide any meaningful analysis of her due process claim. See id. at 2, 7-8.
Moreover, as shown in Points II-V of the State's brief, none of the other claims
defendant raises on appeal depends for resolution on the unrecorded testimony.
For example, defendant nowhere asserts in her brief that her claims of a speedy trial
violation and cruel and unusual punishment at trial were preserved or otherwise
addressed during either Jonah's or her own unrecorded testimony. See Aplt. Br. at
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2, 8. Nor does she assert that her claims of a self-representation violation and of
ineffective assistance of counsel depend for resolution on the unrecorded testimony.
Id. Defendant's brief is thus inadequate to establish that the unrecorded testimony
is critical to any of the issues she raises on appeal. Accordingly, based on the
authority cited in Point HB. of the State's brief, defendant's due process claim
should be rejected.
*

*

*

Defendant does not appear to raise a sufficiency challenge, but even if she
did, her jury convictions are abundantly supported in the record.
To convict defendant for possessing methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, the State had to prove that defendant "knowingly
and intentionally" "possessed] or use[d] a controlled substance," UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004), "use[d], or [possessed] with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to . . . inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body," UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004), and that
these acts occurred "within a 1000 feet of... a public park," UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837-8(4) (a) (v), (ix) (West 2004).
As set forth in detail in the Statement of the Facts, supra, a dispatch operator,
two law enforcement officers, and a paramedic all testified to defendant's
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intoxicated demeanor and mcriminating statements concerning her possession and
use of the drugs and paraphernalia discovered in her apartment. See e.g., R205:59,
67-73, 80-84, 86-93.

The paraphernalia recovered tested positive for

methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. See id. at 103. There was also testimony
that defendant's apartment abutted a public golf course. Id. at 79. Thus, while
Jonah's testimony would have also supported defendant's convictions, see id. at 114
(prosecutor's closing argument), given the wealth of evidence against defendant,
Jonah's unrecorded testimony was unnecessary here.
This case is thus distinguishable from State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38,998 P.2d 816.
Tunzi's conviction was reversed where "fully one half of the case against [him was]
missing from the record." Id. at f 3. Here, the bulk of the State's evidence—five of
six witnesses—was recorded and, as shown above, that testimony is sufficient to
support defendant's convictions.
As for defendant's partially recorded testimony, it contradicted the State's
evidence, but "[t]estimony that contradicts and impeaches implies that some
evidence was presented that was of sufficient substance to merit contradiction or
impeachment." State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, f 23,167 P.3d 1074. Therefore, a
sufficiency challenge based on missing evidence that is merely contradictory to the
State's substantive evidence "is inherently suspect." Id. Gardner recognizes that it is
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"not an error to conduct a sufficiency of the evidence review when a piece of the
record is missing" and that "an appellate court can rely on the presumption that the
jury disbelieved the evidence in conflict with the jury verdict and find that there is
evidence sufficient support the jury's findings." Id. at % 25.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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